González, Presidente

Later this week, diplomat Edmundo González should be sworn into Venezuela’s highest office after his landslide victory in July 2024. Yet, the streets of Caracas, the capital, may look deserted that day. So far, dictator Nicolas Maduro has not conceded defeat, and González is in exile after facing state persecution.

The election was a spectacle of deception. International observers were denied entry at the eleventh hour, and Maduro’s puppet electoral authority blamed a sham terrorist attack for withholding results. Almost at midnight he was declared President-elect with an absurd 51.2000% of the votes, showing his desperate struggle to perpetuate himself in power.

Millions took to the streets, prompting a brutal response by the regime. Dozens of protesters were killed, and Maduro’s secret police sent 2,000 people to Helicoide, a dystopian prison where tortures abound. In the latest sign of the country’s collapse into a failed state, prominent opposition leaders were abducted, with their whereabouts unknown to this day.

The country used to be a rare success story. Home to the world’s largest oil reserves, Venezuela was for years a thriving democracy in a region dominated by impoverished dictatorships. However, the rise of Hugo Chávez in 1999 marked the beginning of an illiberal regime where dissent was oppressed as militarised thugs filled the state. Years of economic mismanagement drained state coffers, plunging the country into one of the worst hyperinflations in world history. Today, the minimum wage is roughly three U.S. dollars, and the state is accused of promoting illegal drug trade for fiscal revenue.

To date, more people have fled Venezuela than Syria after 13 years of war, and experts estimate that another five million could escape if Maduro remains in power. Thousands have left by foot only to be imprisoned in illegal prisons across the continent. Now, as the regime resembles a house of cards, the chance of a civil war increases each day. The disaster would be Dantesque, so the world must act. For several reasons, the momentum for change could not be better.

Crucially, the elections unveiled a majority turning their backs on Chavismo after years of blind popular support for it. Maria Corina Machado, once a far-right hawk, managed to unite the opposition by becoming a reformist, and Venezuelans rallied behind her. For many, the staggering diaspora marked the change in public sentiment —in a country with strong family traditions, Machado notoriously pledged to bring them back.

Furthermore, Maduro has lost key pillars for his regime. His credibility among Venezuelans is non-existent, as it is with key allies like Brazil and Mexico, whose leaders won’t attend his sham inauguration. Furthermore, the key Cuban intelligence believed to underpin his regime faces its most severe economic downturn in decades. Recently, the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria showed him that his network of kleptocracies —Russia and Iran— may not come for help did he need it (he needs it now).

The path forward, however, is anything but clear, and most of it is in Washington’s court. Donald Trump shouldn’t intervene as that would only increase Maduro’s support, while harsh sanctions would only increase the humanitarian disaster. Instead, he should remember that regimes like these can fall in a blink of an eye, and he should take steps to bring it about.

In the shortest term, he should intend to stabilise the region against a new migration catastrophe. Although outdated, the Iranian Nuclear Deal offers a path forward as, for years, it deterred Tehran from pursuing further military ambitions. A similar pact should be offered to Maduro in exchange for ending his expansionist thuggery and the mass exile of targeted opposition groups, such as young people.

In the meantime, Washington should protect and prepare the Venezuelan opposition as, rather sooner than later, they will govern the most conflictive country in the region. Meanwhile, it should work to break the regime’s military loyalty —sanctions against middle-men bureaucrats may prompt division, while a safe way out may push military elites to escape. The ousting of Chile’s dictator in the 90s proves that difficult negotiations are the best way towards democratic transition.

This way, the fall of the dictatorship will take longer to unravel, but the consequences will be more robust. For now, the opposition should be reminded that, ultimately, the responsibility lies in its hands.